Social Movements in Iran

Social Movements in Iran

Babak Emad

Many scholars and theorists have sought to develop comprehensive theories to explain the mechanisms of social changes and transformation. Among these, Karl Marx is the most renowned. Together with Engels, Marx begins his explanation of the historical transformations of human societies with premises that are neither arbitrary nor dogmatic but are grounded in reality. Ignoring these premises would only be conceivable in the realm of imagination. These premises include real individuals, their activities, and the material conditions of their existence.

Social movements are one of the primary mechanisms of political and social change. This mechanism has been studied by Orientalists such as Karl Wittfogel and subsequently by Ahmad Ashraf, Homayoun Katouzian, and, finally, John Foran. Broadly speaking, two theories emerge among these scholars regarding this issue. One is Wittfogel’s theory of Eastern despotism, which denies the possibility of change through social movements. The other is Foran’s theory of fragile resistance, which argues that the coalition nature of movements makes them fragile. These theories focus on the generality and coalition-based nature of social movements, in contrast to Marx and Engels’ theory, which posits that social movements can only lead to structural changes when intertwined with class struggle and its mechanisms, with the lower classes united and standing against the ruling power and class.

According to Marx and Engels, the understanding of changes and transformations requires the understanding of the dialectical relationship of the propositions of the history of human society.

However, one of these premises, as highlighted by Marx and Engels, is not uniform across the globe. This difference can lead to other disparities among human societies because, in this framework, the social formations of any society are a product of the dialectical interaction of its premises. Thus, since the nature of the East and West differs, their social formations are also distinct.

Based on Wittfogel and Foran’s theories, many social movements can be observed during periods of weakened despotic powers. However, the fragility of these movements has prevented political and social changes. Both perspectives explain only part of the existing reality. Building on this relationship and Herbert Blumer’s stages of movement theory, the outcome of this research is a synthesis theory to explain movements and the issue of structural political and social transformations in Iranian society.

According to Iranian studies and Marx and Engels’ findings, Iran’s social history aligns with the class history of Western Europe, where class movements are the primary mechanism of social transformation. The bourgeois movement led to the Constitutional Revolution, introducing Iran to the capitalist era, a process that continued under the Pahlavi monarchy.

Class conflict, considered the driving force of history and social structures, is one of the main assumptions of these thinkers. They also recall the long historical periods during which similar social formations recurred with different labels. For example, Katouzian describes this prolonged period as a dual-structure system where one side consists of people deprived of any rights, and the other side features an autocratic ruler. He highlights the characteristic conflict between the government and the people. Before proposing his view, Katouzian explains Marx’s concept of stasis and its manifestations from his perspective: “Iran has indeed witnessed transformations; governments, dynasties, religions, ideologies, languages, art, literature, science, and technology have all undergone changes.” He concludes that throughout its long history, Iran has been governed by autocratic regimes. However, this does not mean that Iran has not experienced significant changes in its history.

Among social movement theorists, Herbert Blumer stands out for addressing the process of movement formation. Blumer believes that when existing mechanisms for continuous action in society are disrupted, or people’s interpretation and definition of issues change, and when governance makes life unbearable, the likelihood of collective behaviors and social unrest, including social movements, increases. The significance of social unrest lies in its dual role: it signals societal collapse and the necessity of altering the social order while also indicating readiness to adopt new social structures and continuous actions.

Blumer argues that one of the goals of social movements is to establish a new order of life. They draw their motivational power from dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and aspirations for a new life system that promises freedom, welfare, and happiness. Regarding the various stages of social movements and the emergence of new orders of life, Blumer notes that social movements initially lack form, organisation, and structure, relying primarily on spontaneous mechanisms. As they evolve, they acquire organisation, leadership, collective division of Labour, social rules, and values.

Blumer categories social movements into three types: general social movements, specific social movements, and expressive social movements. The term “general” refers to movements that do not exclusively involve a specific group or class but can bring together diverse social groups around social issues. Based on this premise, the social movements that emerged in Iran from 2009 onwards, particularly in December 2017, November 2019, and the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement in 2022, were general movements. While primarily occurring in smaller cities or impoverished urban areas, these movements were not representative of a particular social group or class and lacked a defined leadership, with the exception of the Green Movement, whose leadership was held by a faction within the government and reformists.

Blumer also describes specific social movements, which occur in particular regions or around regional issues, or represent a specific social group or class. In these movements, a defined class stands against the ruling class and authoritarian rule, gathering support from similar social groups. Such movements are more likely to resist the ruling elite and alter social structures, often employing tools like strikes to counteract the repressive apparatus of the ruling system. Iran experienced this to some extent during the 1979 Revolution, although the class representing the strikes did not assume the leadership of the revolutionary movement, leading to the revolution’s eventual derailment.

In expressive movements, continuous actions are often accompanied by displays of emotions and group sentiments, such as in artistic movements.

Based on fundamental assumptions in Iranian studies, and theorising in the historical sociology of Iran and the experiences that Iran has gone through in the past hundred years, one of the mechanisms of change in societies like Iran is the formation of social movements. However, most movements, particularly protest, transformative, and revolutionary movements during the Islamic Republic, failed to achieve social change but left significant impacts on society and paved the way for future movements.

Why have most of these movements failed and been unable to change the social structure? According to Blumer’s model, the failure of social movements throughout history stems, on the one hand, from the inadequate functioning of the dialectical elements of the movement and, on the other, from their failure to take the necessary steps. The ultimate fragility of these movements in various instances is influenced by the complex foundations of Iranian society, their lack of widespread appeal and weakness, and the range of violent methods employed by the ruling power (in this case, the Islamic Republic) to crush them.

Blumer emphasises that the persistence of authoritarian regimes in societies like Iran is not due to their absolute and pervasive power. Instead, due to the diverse structure of society, authoritarian regimes use widespread violence to prevent the formation and consolidation of social movements. Through violence, they isolate sections of society unwilling to pay any price to change the social structure, forcing them into passivity. Additionally, by unleashing extreme violence, they fragment and weaken the movements. This fragmentation impacts the process and success of social movements.

Before addressing the question, John Foran explores the factors that give rise to social movements in countries like Iran. Instead of employing a universal theory of social transformation, he uses a framework that examines the specific historical processes of class formation within a particular social configuration, subjected to the pressures of economic contradictions and unrestrained state repression. He argues that the emergence of conditions for transforming the social framework can provide a foundation for unrest and social movements. Furthermore, he adds that whenever authoritarian power weakens, the possibility of public protests in the form of movements and transformation arises.

The “fragile resistance theory” is more focused on explaining the reasons behind the failure of broad movements. It seems that, to examine the causes of the failure of social movements in Iran, one must consider the theory of Eastern despotism. As the foundations of Eastern despotism weaken, such movements emerge in different parts of Iran. Conversely, when the foundations of despotism are re-established, social movements decline. The failure and lack of success in the process of movements, as per Blumer’s five-step framework, does not mean that these interactions fail to create any change in society. By examining the impacts of movements such as the Constitutional Revolution, the 1979 Revolution, and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, one can conclude that even failed social movements have had significant effects on subsequent social developments. Most social movements in Iran, particularly during the Islamic Republic era and the late Pahlavi era, have been decentralised, leaderless, and nationwide.

A Brief Overview of Social Movements During the Islamic Regime of Iran.

The “Woman, Life, Freedom” Movement or the “Shina” Movement

This transformative and revolutionary movement began with the killing of Mahsa (Shina)[i] Amini and the 1401 (2022) uprising. This movement, in continuation of its revolutionary path, created a revolutionary situation.  The movement’s character is democratic, with demands for equality and freedom prominently centered around the issue of compulsory hijab. The defining slogan of the movement, “Woman, Life, Freedom”, spread across all cities in Iran, garnering support from diverse layers of society. Despite the Islamic Republic’s use of its repressive apparatus to criminalise unveiled women and declare such actions as “religious mandates,” the visible presence and resistance of women without headscarves in the streets has kept the movement alive.

For the Islamic Regime, the hijab holds strategic, political, identity-based, discursive, and authoritarian significance, serving as a tool for oppressing women and the society as a whole.

The demands of this movement can be divided into two categories:

1. 1. Defiance of the Islamic Republic’s laws, which impose a way of life on the people, especially women, interfering in even the smallest aspects of their lives. The most prominent of these demands—highlighted through the movement—is freedom of clothing.

1. 1. Political reforms in the governing structure, aiming for a shift to a democratic and secular system.

This movement is decentralised and nationwide, with participation from all cities and provinces. When people in one region face repression, others rise in support. Unlike previous movements where a few cities served as focal points, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement is widespread and without a central hub. Its inclusivity surpasses even the scope of movements like the “Reform Movement” and the “Green Movement.”

Geographically extensive, socially diverse, sustained in duration, and unprecedented in the number of gatherings and pressure on the regime, this movement has broken records for protest movements in the history of the Islamic Regime.

The Women, Life, Freedom movement in Iran is still active as of January 2025, despite the harsh repression by the Iranian authorities. Majority of the women in Iran defining women do not wear the compulsory Hijab (Scarf)

The Aban 1398 (November 2019) Protests

The protests began on 15 November 2019 after the Iranian regime introduced a new petrol rationing system and increased fuel prices by 200%. Initially peaceful and concentrated in working-class and impoverished urban areas, the protests were sparked by the fuel price hike. However, with the intervention of security forces and shootings at protesters, the demonstrations escalated and began targeting the Islamic Regime of Iran and its leadership.

According to a report by a security agency, the November protests took place in 29 provinces and hundreds of cities. In its initial response to suppress the protests, the Islamic Republic disrupted mobile internet in major cities such as Mashhad, Ahvaz, Bhabhan, Isfahan, and Tehran. As the protests expanded, the government shut down internet access nationwide on 16 November.

Various social and economic factors, as well as domestic and foreign policies of the regime, contributed to the formation of these protests. Distrust, economic hardship, and widespread social dissatisfaction were among the main reasons behind the opposition to the regime. The increase in petrol prices led to a rise in the cost of essential goods, further straining the livelihoods of working-class and impoverished segments of society.

A survey conducted after the December protests revealed that 41% of those dissatisfied with the current state of the country expressed a willingness to participate in protest gatherings. The same survey estimated that nearly 75% of the population in Iran was dissatisfied.

The Day 1396 (December 2017) Protests

This series of leaderless, anti-regime protests across Iran began on 28 December 2017 in Mashhad and other major cities in the Khorasan Province. Initially called for on social media, the protests started as demonstrations against rising prices and corruption within the Islamic Regime. However, as the protests expanded and gained nationwide momentum, they moved beyond economic grievances to openly oppose the Islamic regime itself. “Hatred” of the Islamic Republic among the protesters was one of the main factors of these protests.

The lack of specific demands and the protests starting from the periphery and moving towards central cities were notable characteristics of this movement. Another important feature of these protests was that, unlike in 1378 and 1388, the reformists were not behind it. The nationwide spread, decentralised nature, and anti-regime and secular character of the protests were other defining attributes.

The Green Movement: Protests Against the 1988 (2009) Election Results

The Green Movement was a reformist movement within the framework of the Islamic Regime, sparked by public protests against the results of the tenth presidential election, which declared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the winner. The election was a contest between reformist candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, and conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

As in previous elections, Ayatollah Khamenei, prioritising the regime’s interests, ensured that his chosen candidate emerged victorious, disregarding the people’s votes. Many Iranians were aware of this pattern and believed Khamenei had manipulated the election to secure Ahmadinejad’s victory for the regime’s benefit.

Protests reached their peak during Ashura (27 December) and Tasu’a (26 December) of the same year (2009), with hundreds of thousands participating in marches in Tehran. Some sources claimed attendance reached into the millions. Concurrently and afterward, various demonstrations were held in several Iranian cities. This was the first major public uprising following the bloody crackdowns of the 1980s and early 1990s. Initially, the protests focused on election fraud, with slogans like “They stole our votes and are boasting about it!” However, the movement quickly evolved beyond the Green Movement’s framework, directly targeting Khamenei with chants such as “Our leader is a murderer, his rule is invalid” and the Islamic Republic itself with slogans like “Death to the Islamic Republic.”

The police, along with Basij militia, plainclothes agents, and Islamic Guards so called Revolutionary Guards, violently cracked down on the peaceful protests, turning them into bloodshed. In total, approximately 1,400 people were arrested, hundreds were injured, and 72 people were killed. Some sources report the death toll as being in the hundreds.

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1 Mahsa (Shina) Amini, who was a 22-year-old at the time she was held and then killed by the Iran’s morality police for allegedly wearing the mandatory Islamic headscarf too loosely. Women and girls living under the regime of the Islamic Republic, have always lived in extreme structural systems designed to oppress them. In continuation of the revolutionary movement of women life freedom, the majority of Iranian women continue their struggle against the anti-woman laws of the Islamic Regime and refuse to wear the compulsory hijab.